Volume 122
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review Symposium Issue:
Access to Justice: Innovations and Challenges in
Providing Assistance to Pro Se Litigants
Spring 2018

“PFA” Record Expungement as a Tool for
Settlement: Due Process and the Pennsylvania
Protection from Abuse Act
Kyle Semroc

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlr
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons,
Law and Society Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Profession Commons, Legal Remedies
Commons, Legal Writing and Research Commons, and the Legislation Commons
Recommended Citation
Kyle Semroc, “PFA” Record Expungement as a Tool for Settlement: Due Process and the Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act, 122 Dick.
L. Rev. 939 (2018).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlr/vol122/iss3/9

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dickinson
Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\122-3\DIK302.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

9-JUL-18

14:44

“PFA” Record Expungement as a Tool
for Settlement: Due Process and the
Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse
Act
Kyle Semroc*
ABSTRACT
The Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act (PFAA) empowers victims of domestic violence to obtain protection orders
through a hearing process. Once the Protection from Abuse
(PFA) process is initiated, a statewide registry system automatically generates a civil record. Currently, no statutory language
governing the expungement of a PFA record exists in Pennsylvania, and courts have decided that a right to expungement
exists only in limited circumstances. The courts are silent, however, on whether a protection order by consent of the parties
with no admission of abuse is available for expungement.
This Comment begins by describing the procedure by which
a plaintiff files for a protection order and discusses the due process protections embedded within each step of the process. Expungement in the criminal context provides a contrast to the civil
context in the subsequent section. Next, this Comment discusses
case law related to the expungement of civil records in the PFA
context. Finally, an analysis of relevant PFA case law reveals
that a protection order by consent with no admission of abuse
likely cannot be expunged from a defendant’s civil record.
The purpose of the PFAA is to stop current abuse and prevent instances of further abuse. If a consent order could be expunged from a civil record, a defendant may be significantly
more willing to agree to such an order and, thus, the court would
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thank Daniel Hargreaves, Esq. for showing me how an effective litigator and zealous advocate counsels clients, navigates the courthouse, and commands the courtroom. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents, Phyllis and Gary Semroc, for
teaching me the power of positive attitude, the necessity of perseverance, and the
benefits of living a simple life.
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be able to serve the best interests of the victims of domestic
abuse.
Therefore, a PFA attorney should be able to efficiently and
effectively settle a PFA matter before the dispute ever reaches
the final hearing; the potential for expungement would provide a
PFA attorney with a powerful tool for settlement and, thus, the
Pennsylvania Legislature should amend the PFAA to include an
expungement provision. Because expungement is presently not
available for consent orders, this Comment proposes amending
the PFAA and two additional alternatives to circumvent the prohibition on expungement.
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INTRODUCTION

The Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act (PFAA)1 does
not contain a provision related to the expungement of Protection
from Abuse (PFA) records. Courts in Pennsylvania have held that
a limited right to expunge a PFA record exists as “an adjunct of due
process.”2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has yet to
decide whether a final order3 by consent4 of the parties granting the
plaintiff’s petition for protection from abuse5 can be expunged from
a defendant’s civil record.
This lack of guidance poses a problem for parties seeking to
settle PFA matters prior to the final hearing in the form of a consent order.6 If clear guidelines related to the expungement of consent orders existed, then attorneys could use the availability of
expungement as a bargaining tool during settlement negotiations
for consent orders.7 The opportunity for expungement may create
the incentive for a defendant to agree to a more favorable consent
order for the plaintiff and bring about a cessation of abuse.
The purpose of this Comment is to provide an overview of the
PFAA, synthesize Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior Court decisions related to the expungement of civil records, and provide solutions to the lack of statutory expungement guidelines for PFA
orders. The inquiry of this Comment is limited to PFA matters in
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and those civil records that are
archived by the Protection from Abuse Database (PFAD) system.8
1. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6101 (2017).
2. Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186, 190 (Pa. 2002).
3. See PA. R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (“A final order is any order that disposes of all
claims and of all parties.”). See also 20 WEST’S PA. PRAC., APPELLATE PRACTICE
§ 341:3.1.1L (“An order granting a petition for protection from abuse and disposing of all claims raised in the petition is final under Pa. R.A.P. 341(b), notwithstanding that other matters, such as a child custody dispute, may be ongoing
between the parties.”).
4. See PA. R. PHILA. CO. FAMILY DIV. 1901.11(a) (“The parties may agree to
the entry of a final order by consent.”).
5. § 6106(a) (“An adult or an emancipated minor may seek relief under this
chapter . . . by filing a petition with the court alleging abuse by the defendant.”).
6. § 6108(a) (“The court may grant any protection order or approve any consent agreement to bring about a cessation of abuse of the plaintiff or minor children.”). This Comment uses “consent agreement,” “final order by consent,” and
“consent order” interchangeably throughout. See infra Part II.A–IV.
7. Aaron Weems, Expungement of PFA Records an Important but Often
Overlooked Tool, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (May 6, 2016, 8:57 PM), http://
www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202756926860/Expungement-of-PFA-Recordsan-Important-but-Often-Overlooked-Tool.
8. § 6105(e) (“The Pennsylvania State Police shall establish a Statewide registry of protection orders and shall maintain a complete and systematic record and
index of all valid temporary and final court orders of protection, court-approved
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Part II.A of this Comment discusses the nuances of the PFAA and
describes the hearing procedure9 in addition to illuminating the
purpose of the Act.10 Part II.B of this Comment outlines the way in
which courts handle record expungement in the criminal realm11 as
a contrast to expungement in the civil realm, as discussed in Part
II.C.12
Part III.A of this Comment summarizes the three crucial cases
related to PFA record expungement.13 Part III.B of this Comment
synthesizes the PFA record expungement cases to provide a likely
answer as to whether an order by consent with no admission of
abuse is available for expungement under current Pennsylvania law
and considers the public policy implications of PFA record expungement.14 Finally, Part III.C provides three proposed resolutions to the lack of statutory authority and Pennsylvania Supreme
Court precedent for expungement of a consent agreement.15 This
Comment ultimately suggests that amendment of the PFAA to allow expungement in limited circumstances would coincide with the
purpose of the Act.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. The Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act
1. PFA Definitions
The Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act (PFAA) governs
acts of abuse committed by family or household members, sexual or
intimate partners, and persons who share biological parenthood.16
The purpose of the PFAA is to prevent the escalation of disputes
among those with “familial relationships” where injury is likely to
occur.17 If no requisite familial relationship as defined by the statute exists, then the plaintiff will not have standing to pursue a proconsent agreements and a foreign protection order filed pursuant to section
6104(d). . . .”).
9. § 6107 (outlining the procedure a plaintiff must follow to obtain a protection from abuse court order).
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122 (2017) (providing the method by which criminal defendants may expunge criminal history record information).
12. See infra Part II.B–C.
13. See Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186 (Pa. 2002); Commonwealth v.
Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); Commonwealth v. Nelson, 690 A.2d
728 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); infra Part III.A.
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. See infra Part III.C.
16. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102 (2017).
17. See McCance v. McCance, 908 A.2d 905, 910 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (“The
entire thrust of the Protection from Abuse Act and rules of civil procedure is to
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tection order.18 A PFA petitioner is required to establish that
abuse has occurred by a preponderance of the evidence instead of
the criminal evidentiary burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.19 Cases exist in which the abusive events in question do not
rise to the level of criminal culpability, but the victim is still able to
file for a civil protection order.20 Five ways exist for a defendant
possessing a familial relationship with a plaintiff to commit abuse
and thus be subject to a protection order under the PFAA.21
The first type of abuse listed in the PFAA for which a plaintiff
may seek a protection order is physical abuse.22 Bruising and other
similar marks on an alleged victim can constitute evidence of bodily
injury.23 Instances of pushing, hitting, and choking a victim can indicate that the defendant has inflicted or attempted to inflict some
form of bodily injury.24 The PFAA, however, does not require that
actual physical injury occur in order to meet the statutory definition
of abuse.25
The second type of abuse occurs when a defendant places a
plaintiff in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily harm.26 Past
instances of abuse can form the basis for current reasonable fear of
imminent serious bodily harm in the mind of the plaintiff.27 The
perpetrator of this type of abuse need not act with specific intent to
place a victim in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily harm.28
create an efficient, simple and rapid vehicle for the resolution of family disputes.”
(quoting Mahorsky v. Mahorsky, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 210, 213 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1982))).
18. See Slusser v. DeBoer, 985 A.2d 974, 975 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (stating
that relationship through consanguinity is covered under Title 23, Section 6102 of
the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes in addition to familial relationship by law).
19. See Boykin v. Brown, 868 A.2d 1264, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
20. See Miller ex rel. Walker v. Walker, 665 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (finding that appellant’s argument that his conduct did not rise to the level of
criminal culpability does not defeat the trial court’s protection from abuse order).
21. § 6102.
22. See § 6102(a) (stating that the first type of abuse is “attempting to cause
or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury, serious bodily injury, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, statutory sexual
assault, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault or incest with or without a
deadly weapon”).
23. See B.T.W. ex rel. T.L. v. P.J.L., 956 A.2d 1014, 1016 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
24. See Custer v. Cochran, 933 A.2d 1050, 1058 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
25. See DeHaas ex rel. E.D. v. DeHaas, 708 A.2d 100, 102 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998).
26. § 6102(a)(2).
27. See Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1264 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)
(stating that “facts surrounding the prior PFA consent order are relevant to an
understanding as to the reasonableness of [petitioner’s] fear relative to the present
petition”).
28. See Raker v. Raker, 847 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (stating that
husband’s entrance into wife’s half of duplex in the middle of the night, coupled

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\122-3\DIK302.txt

944

unknown

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Seq: 6

9-JUL-18

14:44

[Vol. 122:939

Actual physical injury as a result of the abuse is not required.29 A
threat to kill, regardless of the existence of any actual or attempted
violence, is sufficient to meet the definition of abuse under this section.30 The court may infer reasonable fear as a result of witness
testimony at a hearing.31
The infliction of false imprisonment, as defined by the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,32 is the third form of abuse detailed by the
PFAA.33 The act of restraining a victim is tied to the deprivation of
his or her liberty and thus the legislature considers this an act of
abuse.34
The fourth type of abuse occurs when the perpetrator physically or sexually abuses a minor child.35 This definition of abuse is
broader than that used in Child Protective Services Law36 and the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code.37
with past incidents of abuse by husband towards wife, were sufficient to establish
that wife reasonably feared serious bodily injury from husband).
29. See McCance v. McCance, 908 A.2d 905, 911 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (finding that defendant’s “verbal chiding, intimidating demeanor (blocking [plaintiff’s]
vehicular access), threat of retaliation, and striking of [plaintiff’s] vehicle to the
point of damaging it coalesce to constitute abusive behavior”).
30. See R.G. v. T.D., 672 A.2d 341, 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). See also Counterman v. Shoemaker, 14 Pa. D. & C.4th 217, 219 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1992), aff’d, 625
A.2d 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating that plaintiff was placed in reasonable fear of
bodily injury when defendant called plaintiff’s phone, stated that he had a gun, and
threatened to kill plaintiff, her fiancé, and her family).
31. See Karch v. Karch, 885 A.2d 535, 539 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (remarking
that “the court determines a witness’s credibility and may infer fear based on the
witness’s testimony describing the defendant’s actions”).
32. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2903 (2017).
33. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102(a)(3) (2017).
34. See Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 984 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). The court
stated:
[T]he appellant has admitted to restraining the appellee during two of the
incidents. During one incident, he admitted restraining her for a period
of ten to fifteen minutes. We believe there was sufficient evidence for the
court to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellant
knowingly restrained the appellee so as to interfere substantially with her
liberty.
Id.
35. § 6102(a)(4).
36. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6301—6385 (2017).
37. See Miller ex rel. Walker v. Walker, 665 A.2d 1252, 1258 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995). The court stated:
[F]or a remedy to be available under PFAA, it is not necessary that physical harm to a child be as serious as that which is required for a child to be
removed from his home and placed in protective custody. Corporal punishment inflicted recklessly or in enraged manner may result in bodily
injury permitting issuance of protection order under PFAA.
Id.
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The final type of abuse under the PFAA deals with a course of
conduct that places a person in reasonable fear of bodily injury.38
Unlike the second type of abuse, although the acts and events individually may not amount to abuse, the totality of the actions, when
viewed in relation to one another, can constitute abuse under this
provision.39 The reviewing court often looks to the timeline of
events that the petitioner experiences and assesses the reasonableness of the petitioner’s fear at each stage.40 Once any one of these
alleged acts of abuse occurs, a prospective plaintiff may initiate the
PFA hearing process.41
2. PFA Hearing Process and Relief
To begin the PFA process, an adult or emancipated minor must
file a petition with the court in which he or she alleges that the
defendant has perpetrated some form of abuse.42 The plaintiff in a
PFA matter has the option to petition the court for an emergency
temporary protection order by alleging that the plaintiff or the
plaintiff’s minor child is in immediate and present danger of
abuse.43 If the plaintiff seeks this emergency relief, the court must
conduct an ex parte proceeding and use a standard lower than a
preponderance of the evidence to evaluate the plaintiff’s claim.44 A
temporary order remains in effect until the court either modifies or
terminates the order or a plaintiff files a motion to withdraw the
temporary order.45
When a PFA plaintiff successfully petitions the court for either
emergency or non-emergency temporary relief, the court must hold
a hearing within ten business days, during which the plaintiff must
attempt to prove the allegations set forth in the complaint by a pre38. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6102(a)(5) (2017).
39. See Mescanti v. Mescanti, 956 A.2d 1017, 1024 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (remarking that, when determining whether abuse has occurred as a result of a course
of conduct, the court should consider the totality of the defendant’s actions).
40. See id. at 1023 (determining that “[w]ife established, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that [h]usband engaged in a course of conduct that placed [w]ife in
reasonable fear of bodily injury”).
41. § 6107.
42. § 6106(a).
43. § 6107(b)(1).
44. Id. See also Drew v. Drew, 870 A.2d 377, 378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“The
ex parte hearings conducted in order to secure a temporary PFA Order . . . require
only that the petitioner convince the court he or she is in ‘immediate and present
danger of abuse.’” (quoting § 6107(b)(1))).
45. § 6107(b)(2).
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ponderance of the evidence.46 Because of the mandatory duty to
hold a hearing, the court may grant the plaintiff or defendant a continuance in the event that the hearing cannot be held on the scheduled date.47 If the court grants an ex parte temporary order and
continues the proceedings, the temporary order remains in full effect until the court holds a final hearing.48 Even if the court does
not issue a temporary order after it continues and reschedules the
final hearing, the court may, subsequent to the first ex parte hearing
but prior to the final hearing, allow the plaintiff the opportunity to
present new evidence of abuse, at which time the court may issue
an ex parte temporary order “as it deems necessary.”49
For a final hearing to satisfy due process, the court must give
the plaintiff the chance to present witnesses, testify regarding his or
her version of the facts, and cross-examine the opposing party and
his or her witnesses.50 The court must also afford the defendant the
same opportunities as listed above.51 The plaintiff is not “rigorously limited to the specific allegations” set forth in his or her petition and is free to present evidence of prior abuse not detailed in
the petition during the hearing.52 No right to court-appointed
counsel for either the plaintiff or the defendant exists during PFA
hearings; the court must merely advise the parties of their right to
obtain representation.53
As a result of a PFA hearing or settlement negotiation, the
court may grant any protection order or approve any consent agreement to stop the current abuse and prevent the defendant from
abusing the plaintiff in the future.54 The court possesses broad
powers of relief and can issue a protection order to keep the defendant away from the plaintiff,55 evict the defendant from a shared
46. § 6107(a). See also Drew, 870 A.2d at 378 (commenting on the use of
“shall” in Title 23, Section 6107(b)(1) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes to
create a mandatory requirement for the court to hold an evidentiary hearing).
47. Burke ex rel. Burke v. Bauman, 814 A.2d 206, 208 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)
(citing § 6101) (stating that evidentiary hearings are mandatory and thus a continuance may be granted by the court at the request of either party).
48. § 6107(b)(2) (“The order shall remain in effect until modified or terminated by the court after notice and hearing.”).
49. See Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 926 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (citing
§ 6107(c)) (stating, “trial courts have discretion to continue evidentiary hearings
regarding final PFA orders and enter appropriate temporary ex parte orders to
cover the intervening time”).
50. See Lanza v. Simconis, 914 A.2d 902, 906 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
51. Id.
52. See Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 981 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
53. See Weir v. Weir, 631 A.2d 650, 657 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
54. § 6108(a).
55. § 6108(a)(1).
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residence,56 award temporary custody rights to the plaintiff if minor
children are involved,57 and order that the defendant relinquish any
weapons to the sheriff’s department.58 The court wields broad powers of relief to achieve its ultimate goal of preventing abuse.59
3. Purpose of the PFAA
The purpose of the PFAA is to protect victims of domestic violence from the perpetrators of physical and sexual abuse.60 The
PFAA seeks to protect a wide range of people from current and
future abuse, including spouses, household members, intimate partners, and children.61 A court may suspend certain rights held by a
defendant, such as the right to possess firearms,62 in order to
achieve the court’s ultimate goal of abuse prevention.63 To achieve
this goal, courts often utilize an eviction proceeding tied to the temporary protection from abuse order.64
The protections guaranteed by the PFAA are necessary due to
the turmoil arising from the breakdown of deep familial relationships between husbands, wives, children, and other people in intimate relationships.65 The Pennsylvania General Assembly, in
drafting the PFAA, recognized the practical need to temporarily
suspend the procedural due process rights of the defendant.66 The
drafters of the PFAA also recognized that this suspension could not
56. § 6108(a)(2).
57. § 6108(a)(4).
58. § 6108(a)(7).
59. See Heard v. Heard, 614 A.2d 255, 260 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (citing Cipolla v. Cipolla, 398 A.2d 1053, 1054 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)).
60. See Lawrence v. Bordner, 907 A.2d 1109, 1112 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
61. See Weir v. Weir, 631 A.2d 650, 654 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
62. § 6108 (a)(7) (detailing that a court may “[o]rder[ ] the defendant to temporarily relinquish to the sheriff . . . the defendant’s firearms and prohibit[ ] the
defendant from acquiring or possessing any firearm for the duration of the order
and requir[e] the defendant to relinquish to the sheriff any firearm license”).
63. See Kelly v. Mueller, 861 A.2d 984, 993 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), vacated, 912
A.2d 202 (Pa. 2006).
64. See McCance v. McCance, 908 A.2d 905, 908 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (“The
goal of the Protection from Abuse Act is protection and prevention of further
abuse by removing the perpetrator of the abuse from the household and/or from
the victim for a period of time.” (quoting Viruet v. Cancel, 727 A.2d 591, 595 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1999))).
65. See Cipolla v. Cipolla, 398 A.2d 1053, 1054 n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
66. See Heard v. Heard, 614 A.2d 255, 259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (“To meet the
special circumstances of abuse cases, the legislature fashioned procedures which
suspend, temporarily, the due process rights of the alleged abuser.” (quoting In Re
Penny R., 509 A.2d 338, 340 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986))).
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be without limit and must be subject to judicial restraint.67 When a
PFA matter is initiated, the PFAD system automatically generates a
record of the filings and proceedings.68 This Comment will discuss
the issues created by this automatic generation of civil records combined with a lack of statutory authority for PFA expungement,69
but this Comment will first provide an overview of how expungement operates in the criminal context in order to illuminate a possible framework for how expungement could operate in the context
of a PFA.70
B. Expungement Law in the Criminal Realm
1. Basis for Criminal Record Expungement
Although statutory authority is the primary mechanism for
criminal record expungement,71 a criminal defendant, in certain
limited circumstances, has a due process right to petition for expungement of an arrest record that is not dependent upon statutory
authority.72 The Pennsylvania General Assembly has laid out
guidelines for when expungement of criminal records is appropriate, including situations such as when no disposition has been received by the court,73 when an individual subject to arrest
information has reached the age of 70 and has not been arrested or
prosecuted for at least ten years,74 and when the charged offense is
a summary offense and the individual seeking expungement has not
been arrested or prosecuted for at least five years following conviction for that offense.75
An arrest record may place certain difficulties and hardships
on a defendant, and criminal record expungement is intended to
afford a defendant some form of due process protection against
67. See In Re Penny R., 509 A.2d at 340 (stating that “[c]ontinued suspension,
irrespective of motivating factors, cannot be countenanced without judicial limits,
subject to substantive or procedural restraint”).
68. § 6105(e)(3) (“The registry of the Pennsylvania State Police shall be available at all times to inform courts, dispatchers and law enforcement officers of any
valid protection order involving any defendant.”).
69. See infra Part II.C.1.
70. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122 (2017).
71. “Expunge” is defined as, “to remove from a record, list, or book; to erase
or destroy.” Expunge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
72. See Commonwealth v. V.G., 9 A.3d 222, 224 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (citing
Commonwealth v. Waughtel, 999 A.2d 623, 625 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010)).
73. § 9122(a)(1).
74. § 9122(b)(1).
75. § 9122(b)(3). Other situations justifying expungement include when an
individual has been dead for three years under Section 9122(b)(2) or when an individual’s offense satisfies the conditions expressed in Section 9122(a)(2).
§§ 9122(b)(2), 9122(a)(2).
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these hardships.76 For example, information related to an arrest
may inflict substantial damage to an individual’s reputation.77 The
arrestee may additionally suffer economic losses that are direct and
serious.78 Even if an arrestee is acquitted of the charges involved,
the arrestee may be restricted from applying for or denied certain
opportunities for schooling, employment, or professional licenses.79
Furthermore, police may utilize an arrest record as a factor to determine whether to arrest an individual in a new criminal matter, or
whether to exercise discretion in a charging decision.80
2. Wexler Balancing Test
The expungement of a criminal record is an uphill battle for a
defendant because statutory authority typically governs criminal record expungement and is limited in scope and availability.81 When
a petitioner seeks the expungement of a criminal record, the court
can, under even more limited circumstances, grant a hearing in
which the court weighs factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Wexler82 to determine whether expungement is appropriate.83 The defendant in Wexler was arrested and charged with corruption of a
minor after police found marijuana and drug paraphernalia in his
minor daughter’s bedroom.84 The Commonwealth also filed criminal conspiracy charges against the juvenile’s mother.85
After the juvenile daughter entered a consent decree in juvenile court, the Commonwealth filed a petition for nolle prosequi86
of the charges against the juvenile’s parents.87 The court granted
the petition for nolle prosequi and the co-defendants subsequently
filed a petition to expunge the arrest records related to the aforementioned incident.88 Following a hearing, the hearing judge
denied the petition to expunge the arrest records.89 The
76. See Commonwealth v. Giulian, 141 A.3d 1262, 1269–70 (Pa. 2016). See
also Commonwealth v. Butler, 672 A.2d 806 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
77. See Commonwealth v. Malone, 366 A.2d 584, 587–88 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976)
(quoting Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490–91 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. § 9122.
82. Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 878.
85. Id. at 879.
86. “Nolle prosequi” is defined as “a legal notice that a lawsuit or prosecution
has been abandoned.” Nolle Prosequi, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
87. Wexler, 431 A.2d at 879.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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co-defendants appealed and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the denial of the petition.90 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed and held that the petition to expunge the arrest
records should have been granted.91
If a court decides that expungement may be appropriate, then
the court must compare the detriment to the benefit resulting from
the existence of the defendant’s criminal record.92 The court ultimately considers the strength of the Commonwealth’s case against
the petitioner regarding the underlying criminal allegations versus
the petitioner’s interest in reducing the stigma and harm to the petitioner stemming from a criminal record.93 The court can consider
why the Commonwealth would want to retain the records in light of
the detriment it causes to the petitioner.94 The court may also inquire into the petitioner’s age, prior criminal record, and past employment opportunities as well as the time between the arrest and
the petition to expunge and any specific harsh effects that the petitioner alleges in considering the expungement petition.95
The procedure for a Wexler hearing is fairly simple. If the
judge orders the expungement of the defendant’s arrest record, the
attorney for the Commonwealth may object to the expungement.96
If the attorney’s objections are timely filed, the judge must hold a
hearing on the objections.97 During this hearing, the burden is on
the Commonwealth to prove that the record should be maintained.98 The Commonwealth must convince the judge with specificity that the defendant is not entitled to an expungement of his or
her arrest record.99
Wexler hearings typically occur in the context of a request for
expungement of a criminal history record containing instances of
non-conviction, such as acquittal or nolle prosequi.100 The Com90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Iacino, 411 A.2d 754, 759 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1979)). See also Commonwealth v. Wallace, 97 A.3d 310, 319 (Pa. 2014)
(“[G]ranting an expungement in this case would neither enhance Appellee’s employment opportunities nor assist Appellant in casting off the stigma of the
charges, as the rest of Appellee’s arrest record and record of his felony convictions
still exist.”).
94. See Wexler, 431 A.2d at 879 (quoting Iacino, 411 A.2d at 759).
95. Id.
96. PA. R. CRIM. P. 320.
97. See Wexler, 431 A.2d at 879 (quoting Iacino, 411 A.2d at 759).
98. Id.
99. Wexler, 431 A.2d at 881 (“The mere assertion of a general interest in
maintaining accurate records of those accused of crime is not convincing.”).
100. Id. at 880.
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monwealth must then argue that the value of retaining the arrest
record substantially outweighs the benefits of expungement, which
is a significant burden.101 Although criminal record expungement is
typically governed by statutory authority,102 the granting of a Wexler hearing is one of the limited situations in which a defendant may
rely solely on due process protections in order to expunge parts of a
criminal record.103 No similar statutory authority exists in the context of civil record expungement.104
C. Expungement Law in the Civil Realm
The expungement of civil records is governed solely by case
precedent derived from due process protections.105 Temporary protection orders that never make it to the final hearing phase, due to
acts like voluntary or court ordered withdrawal, can be expunged
from a civil record.106 In P.E.S. v. K.L.,107 plaintiff P.E.S. filed a
Petition for Protection from Abuse against defendant K.L., and the
court denied the plaintiff’s request for a temporary protection order.108 The court scheduled a final hearing for the following week
but neither the plaintiff nor the defendant attended the hearing.109
Even though both parties failed to appear, the court created a record based on the petition and marked the case as active in the
computer system.110 Four months later, K.L. sought to have the record of the petition removed from the computer system and filed a
Motion to Dismiss and Expunge the Record.111 K.L. argued that
because the case was designated as “active,” the court record damaged his reputation due to his unique position as a custody evaluator and guardian ad litem.112 The court granted K.L.’s Motion to
Dismiss but refused to grant the Motion to Expunge.113
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the expungement
of a PFA order is appropriate when the petitioner is not granted a
101. Id.
102. § 9122.
103. 103. See Wexler, 431 A.2d at 879.
104. See P.E.S. v. K.L., 720 A.2d 487, 489 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
105. See id. at 489–90.
106. Id. at 491.
107. P.E.S. v. K.L., 720 A.2d 487 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
108. Id. at 488.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. At the time that this case was appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, K.L. was the Director of Custody Evaluation Services of Philadelphia, Inc.
Id.
113. Id.
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temporary protection order or when both of the parties fail to appear at the final hearing and no further action is taken on the petition.114 The court likened expungement in situations where the
final hearing does not occur to that of an improper or illegal involuntary mental health commitment.115 The Pennsylvania Superior
Court found that expungement of K.L.’s record was appropriate
and placed substantial weight on his unique position as a child custody specialist and the plaintiff’s failure to pursue her abuse petition.116 A permanent civil record stating that K.L. committed
abuse could have potentially ruined K.L.’s reputation and career,
despite the underlying facts of the petition having never been
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.117
If a PFA petitioner is successful in convincing the court at the
ex parte hearing stage that he or she is in immediate danger, then
the court automatically generates a civil record regardless of
whether the underlying allegations have been proved by a preponderance of the evidence and without giving notice to the PFA defendant.118 The automatic generation of a civil record, combined
with the lack of a statutorily authorized expungement mechanism,
can create a great hardship for a wrongly accused defendant.119
III.

ANALYSIS

A. PFA Record Expungement Case Law
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to decide
whether a consent order is eligible for expungement,120 case law
concerning other issues related to PFA record expungement helps
illuminate how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could potentially
rule on this issue.121 If the PFA proceedings never reach the final
hearing and the court does not issue a final order, then the defen114. Id. at 492.
115. See id. at 491 (“[J]ustice demands that appellant be returned to a position as near as possible as to that which [he or she] enjoyed prior to the [commencement of the action], namely, an unsullied record.” (quoting Commonwealth
v. J.T., 420 A.2d 1064, 1065–66 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980))).
116. See P.E.S., 720 A.2d at 492.
117. Id.
118. See Drew v. Drew, 870 A.2d 377, 378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“The ex parte
hearings conducted in order to secure a temporary PFA Order . . . require only
that the petitioner convince the court he or she is in ‘immediate and present danger of abuse.’”).
119. Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 924 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (“A person may
blithely execute a petition inflating claims of abuse.”).
120. 120. See supra text accompanying notes 3–6.
121. See infra Part III.A.1–3.
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dant can petition the court for expungement of the PFA records.122
Conversely, if the court holds a hearing and enters a final order,
then the PFA records are unavailable for expungement.123 Further,
because consent orders are fully enforceable, the violation of a consent order can result in the same consequences for the defendant as
a violation of a final order entered after a hearing.124
1. Carlacci v. Mazaleski
According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Carlacci v.
Mazaleski,125 in cases where the petitioner seeks to protect his or
her reputation, a right to petition for expungement of a PFAA record exists.126 The court remarked that this right is an “adjunct of
due process” and does not depend on express statutory authority.127
Further, the court noted that when the parties in PFAA proceedings discontinue the matter before a final hearing occurs, and when
the parties stipulate that the temporary PFA order should be declared null and void, expungement is warranted.128 Because the
proceedings in Carlacci did not reach the final hearing phase, the
plaintiff never had the opportunity to prove the underlying abuse
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.129 In the view of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the PFAA proceedings did not
“legally evolve[ ]” past the temporary order stage, and, thus, the
maintenance of a civil record was unjustified.130
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court likened this situation to that
of a criminal defendant who has been tried and acquitted,131 a situa122. See infra text accompanying notes 125–36.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 137–50.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 151–59.
125. Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186 (Pa. 2002).
126. See id. at 190.
127. Id. (citing PA. CONST. art. I, § 1) (characterizing due process rights by
stating “all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent
and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of
pursuing their own happiness”).
128. See Carlacci, 798 A.2d at 190–91.
129. Id. at 190.
130. See id. at 191 (quoting Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 757 A.2d 988 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1999) (Cercone, J., in dissenting memorandum). President Judge Emeritus
Cercone stated in his dissenting memorandum:
Despite the passage of time, the [PFAA] proceedings never legally
evolved beyond the temporary order stage as the Trial Court merely continued the original temporary order which was issued ex parte. The Trial
Court did not issue a permanent order or make any . . . findings of fact
that incidents of abuse had occurred.
Id.
131. Id. at 191.
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tion in which expungement is appropriate as a matter of law without the use of the Wexler balancing test.132 Further, the use of the
Wexler balancing test would be “unnecessary and inappropriate”
because the test would effectively assess the strength of the prosecution’s case, despite the defendant having already obtained the
verdict of acquittal.133 In order to apply the first factor of the Wexler balancing test in a PFA matter, the trial court would have to
assess the strength of the PFA petition.134 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that it was not proper to grant a Wexler hearing
for a PFA petition that had been dismissed by court order before
the plaintiff had an opportunity to prove the underlying allegations
of abuse.135 A Wexler balancing test analysis is therefore unnecessary and improper when a court order dismisses the PFA petition or
when the PFAA proceedings never evolve past the temporary order
stage.136
2. Commonwealth v. Charnik
According to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, after a PFA
case reaches the final hearing stage and a final order is entered, the
record of the proceeding may not be expunged.137 In Commonwealth v. Charnik,138 the defendant sought to expunge a final PFA
order after the plaintiff withdrew the final order.139 The lower
court entered a PFA order after it conducted a full hearing and
found that the plaintiff proved the underlying allegations of abuse
by a preponderance of the evidence.140 The superior court found
this situation to be more analogous to a conviction record than to a
non-conviction record.141
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. The court stated:
Just as we found it “improper to go behind a verdict of acquittal and
purport to assess the strength of the prosecution’s case” in attempting to
apply the first factor of the Wexler balancing test in a criminal expungement matter, it is equally improper to assess the strength of a PFAA petition that has since been dismissed by court order before the plaintiff even
attempted to meet its burden of proving the allegation of abuse contained
in the PFAA petition, in attempting to apply the Wexler balancing test in
a PFAA expungement matter.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. D.M., 695 A.2d 770, 772 (Pa. 1997)).
136. Id.
137. Commonwealth v. Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214, 1215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
138. Commonwealth v. Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
139. See id. at 1215.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1218 (quoting Commonwealth v. D.M., 695 A.2d 770, 772 (Pa.
1997) (explaining the difference between conviction records, which can be ex-
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The defendant presented the court with a logical argument for
extending the language of Carlacci to allow for a Wexler balancing
test in cases where a final hearing is held and a final PFA order is
granted but subsequently withdrawn.142 The court was hesitant to
agree.143 The defendant’s argument ultimately failed because, unlike in the cases of P.E.S. and Carlacci, the lower court completed
the PFA process and afforded the defendant procedural due process by conducting the hearing and giving the defendant a chance to
defend against the allegations of abuse.144 In deciding that expungement was inappropriate in this case, the Superior Court recognized that certain patterns associated with the filing and trying of
PFA cases existed and that practical considerations play a role in
deciding whether to extend or limit protections granted by the court
to defendants.145
The Pennsylvania Superior Court explained that the expungement of a PFA record is never appropriate once the matter reaches
the final hearing phase and a final order is granted.146 Relying on
the specific facts of this case, the superior court voiced a lack of
willingness to allow expungement because of limited judicial resources and the practical considerations of expunging a civil record
for a defendant who also has a criminal record that included convicpunged only in limited circumstances authorized by statute, and non-conviction or
arrest records, for which expungement is left to judicial discretion in the form of a
Wexler hearing, such as in cases of nolle prosequi).
142. Id.
143. See id. at 1120. Regarding the defendant’s argument, the court stated:
Charnik asks this Court to take the P.E.S. and Carlacci holdings one step
further and find that, like non-conviction records, he is entitled to a Wexler balancing test on the petition to expunge the PFA record. He claims
that this is the “next step” anticipated by Carlacci. Although we see the
logic in this argument, we decline to extend the language in Carlacci until
our legislature or our Supreme Court directs.
Id.
144. Id. (“Charnik’s argument presumes a constitutional entitlement to seek
expungement, as recognized in Carlacci. Carlacci and P.E.S., however, were based
on records that existed where the PFA process was not completed and therefore
without the safeguards of due process.”).
145. Id. at 1221. Regarding the psychological nature of PFA cases, the court
stated:
We note, too, that the facts of this case illustrate a typical sequence in an
abusive relationship; the abuse, the remorse, the forgiveness, and the repetition of that cycle. Absent extraordinary cause, allowing a hearing to
clear a record of abuse after a final order simply because the victim decided to forgive or “withdraw,” would not only draft the judiciary into the
psychological struggle, but would overwhelm its already limited
resources.
Id.
146. Id. at 1220–21.
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tions for indirect criminal contempt.147 Indirect criminal contempt
(ICC) convictions in general are unavailable for expungement unless the defendant meets one of the limited statutory categories148
of criminal record expungement.149 Thus, even if expungement had
been an option for the defendant, the court would have likely rejected that opportunity because the defendant’s criminal record
would still have contained evidence of the PFA violation despite
the civil record expungement.150
3. Commonwealth v. Nelson
Final PFA orders by consent of the parties without an admission of the underlying allegations of abuse by the defendant are
both authorized and enforceable under the PFAA.151 The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Nelson152 remarked
that the enforceability of consent orders was an issue of first impression for the court because prior case precedent focused solely
on the enforceability of temporary orders and final orders stemming from a final hearing.153
This case arose out of the context of an ICC proceeding,154 and
the defendant argued that he could not be charged with ICC if the
underlying allegations in the PFA had never been proven.155
Neither the PFAA nor subsequent statutory authority expressly requires that consent agreements must be accompanied by an admis147. Id. at 1221.
148. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122(b) (2017).
149. Charnik, 921 A.2d at 1217 (“Here, Charnik is less than 70 years of age
and has not been free of arrest or prosecution for ten years. The trial court’s denial of his petition to expunge the indirect criminal contempt convictions was
proper.” (citing § 9122(b) and Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 749 A.2d 507 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2000))).
150. Id. at 1221 (remarking that “it would be inappropriate, as well as fruitless, to expunge the PFA record when the criminal record would indicate indirect
criminal contempt convictions stemming from violation of a PFA order”).
151. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 690 A.2d 728, 731 (Pa. Super Ct. 1997).
152. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 690 A.2d 728 (Pa. Super Ct. 1997).
153. See id. at 731.
154. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6114(a) (2017). The statute states:
Where the police, sheriff or the plaintiff have filed charges of indirect
criminal contempt against a defendant for violation of a protection order
issued under this chapter, a foreign protection order or a court-approved
consent agreement, the court may hold the defendant in indirect criminal
contempt and punish the defendant in accordance with law.
Id. After the police, sheriff, or the plaintiff file charges of Indirect Criminal Contempt, a hearing to adjudicate the charges is held within ten days. Id. § 6113(f).
155. See Nelson, 690 A.2d at 730.
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sion of abuse.156 The Superior Court looked to a dictionary
definition of “consent” and found that it connotes “acquiescence
without reference to admissions.”157 Therefore, the plain meaning
of the PFAA authorizes consent-based protection orders and renders them fully enforceable.158 Additionally, PFA orders by consent with no admission of abuse are enforceable because the orders
provide sufficient notice to the defendant of potential criminal consequences for violating the order.159
B. PFA Record Expungement Due Process Analysis
1. PFA Case Precedent Synthesis
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that PFA orders issued by consent without an admission of abuse by the defendant
are fully enforceable because the orders do not violate a defendant’s due process rights.160 Because the holding in Nelson161 specifically relied on the reasoning that final PFA orders by consent do
not violate a defendant’s due process rights, such orders are likely
not susceptible to expungement on the same reasoning, that the
court afforded adequate due process protections to the defendant.162 A defendant who willingly consents to the entry of a final
PFA order is provided with the opportunity to present a case and
defend against the allegations of abuse but chooses not to do so.163
The defendant effectively waives his or her right to a final hearing
in exchange for a settlement.164
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court allows expungement in limited cases where the lower court does not afford the defendant an
adequate level of due process in order to “protect the reputation of
a person who was unlawfully thrust into the . . . process.”165 A de156. See id. at 731 (“[T]he court may grant any protection order or approve
any consent agreement to bring about the cessation of abuse.” (citing § 6108(a))).
157. Id. (citing Consent, WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1974)).
158. Id.
159. See id. at 730 (stating that “the order provided that any violation of its
terms could lead to the arrest and prosecution of appellee for indirect criminal
contempt”).
160. Id. at 731–32.
161. Id. (holding that PFA orders by consent with no admission of abuse are
fully enforceable).
162. See id. at 732 (finding that defendant was afforded sufficient procedural
due process through notice because “an examination of the consent order demonstrates that it specifically informed [defendant] that he could be subjected to prosecution for indirect criminal contempt upon violating its terms”).
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186, 189 (Pa. 2002) (citing the reasoning
in Commonwealth ex rel. Magaziner v. Magaziner, 253 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1969)) (ap-
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fendant who consents to the entry of a final PFA order likely has
not been “unlawfully thrust” into the process.166 Such a defendant
has entered into an agreement willingly after the court has provided
sufficient notice of the consequences of a final order.167 Unless the
defendant challenges the order by filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal, the order is final.168 Once the protection order
becomes final, the order is not subject to collateral attack without
the existence of extraordinary circumstances,169 such as when judicial oversight causes the losing party to be denied knowledge of the
entry of a final judgment.170
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Carlacci based on
whether the lower court afforded the defendant procedural due
process, not on whether a sufficient finding of abuse existed.171 A
defendant who agrees to a PFA order by consent effectively waives
his or her right to a hearing and enters into a final order with the
knowledge that the protection order may have a negative effect on
his or her reputation or lead to criminal consequences in the form
of an ICC charge.172
Thus, such a defendant cannot later argue that the court deprived him or her of due process because the consent order provides the defendant with sufficient notice of the repercussions of
violating the order.173 Therefore, case precedent points to the

proving “of the concept of protecting the reputation of a person who was unlawfully thrust into the criminal process by sanctioning the expungement of his
criminal record”).
166. See id.
167. See Nelson, 690 A.2d at 732.
168. See Luckenbaugh v. Shearer, 523 A.2d 399, 402 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
The court stated:
[O]nce a final order or judgment is entered, an appeal must be filed
within thirty days or, the trial court must expressly grant reconsideration
within thirty days. If either of these two events do not occur, the judgment is final and except for “extraordinary cause” is not subject to collateral attack by virtue of a petition to open and/or strike.
Id. See also PA. R.A.P. 1701(b)(3) (“After an appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other government unit may . . . [g]rant
reconsideration of the order which is the subject of the appeal or petition . . . .”).
169. See Luckenbaugh, 523 A.2d at 402.
170. Id. at 401.
171. Carlacci, 798 A.2d at 190–91.
172. Nelson, 690 A.2d at 732.
173. See id. (stating “an examination of the consent order demonstrates that it
specifically informed appellee that he could be subjected to prosecution for indirect criminal contempt upon violating its terms”).
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likely conclusion that expungement is not available for a final order
that was entered into by consent of the parties.174
2. Public Policy Considerations
The ability to expunge a PFA order entered by consent of the
parties in limited circumstances benefits the interests of the parties
and the judicial system. If the ultimate purpose of the Protection
from Abuse Act is to stop current abuse, prevent instances of future abuse, and protect plaintiffs,175 providing parties with a tool to
settle PFA matters amicably through the expungement of a consent
order is seemingly in harmony with at least one purpose of the
PFAA, to not place “impractical burdens” on the petitioner seeking
a protection order.176
As an indicator that public policy might favor the prohibition
of expungement of consent orders, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Carlacci referenced the fact that a prior PFA
docket may be considered by the trial court in subsequent PFA proceedings as well as custody proceedings.177 A defendant’s history
of abuse can be a crucial component of a petitioner’s PFA case,
especially in instances where the plaintiff must show reasonable
fear of imminent serious bodily harm.178 A record of abuse allows
the court to observe patterns of abuse and act accordingly to prevent future abuse.179 Although, even if a repeat defendant was able
to expunge his or her civil record of a prior consent order, the plaintiff in a new PFA proceeding against the same defendant could sim174. Carlacci, 798 A.2d at 191; Commonwealth v. Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214,
1221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); Nelson, 690 A.2d at 732.
175. See Heard v. Heard, 614 A.2d 255, 260 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). See also
Lawrence v. Bordner, 907 A.2d 1109, 1112 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
176. See Weir v. Weir, 631 A.2d 650, 654 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (stating the
purpose of the PFAA is “to provide spouses, household members, intimate partners and children with immediate temporary protection from abuse”) (citing Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 980–982 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). See also Snyder, 629
A.2d at 982 n.2 (“A requirement that Abuse Petitions delineate for the accused
abuser all the incidents of abuse would place an impracticable burden on the
Petitioner.”).
177. See Carlacci, 798 A.2d at 190 (stating, “another consequence of maintenance of a PFAA docket record is the possibility that it can be considered by a trial
court in any subsequent PFAA proceeding”) (citing 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6107(a)
(2017)).
178. See Burke ex rel. Burke v. Bauman, 814 A.2d 206, 209 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002) (stating, “[i]t is possible for a person to be placed in reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury based on telephone calls, particularly when coupled with the
alleged abuser’s past history of violence”) (citing D.H. v. B.O., 734 A.2d 409, 412
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)).
179. See Charnik, 921 A.2d at 1221.
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ply testify regarding the past allegations of abuse and the existence
of an expunged consent order.180
In contrast with the creation of a per se rule that grants expungement in PFA cases that do not evolve past the temporary
stage is the notion of judicial discretion.181 Although a per se rule
helps to relieve some constraint on limited judicial resources, the
rule would effectively take discretion away from judges in PFA
matters.182 According to Justice Newman’s dissent in Carlacci, judicial discretion is an integral part of the expungement process.183
Thus, if the courts were to allow the expungement of consent orders, Justice Newman would likely advocate for the use of a Wexler
hearing to decide expungement instead of an automatic statutory
expungement.184 Both of these options are considered in the following section, in addition to a third option that does not involve
consent orders but provides an alternative for PFA attorneys to obtain protection for PFA victims without creating a civil record,
which is not currently available for expungement.
C.

Three Proposed Resolutions

1.

Grant Defendant a Wexler Hearing as Part of the Consent
Order

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a
protection order by consent is available for expungement.185 Thus,
until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rules on this issue or legislation changes the current law, parties to PFA matters in Pennsylvania should assume that the expungement of consent orders is
unavailable. The PFA hearing court could, however, consider
granting a Wexler hearing to a defendant who agrees to a consent
order.186 The hearing court would not automatically expunge the
record, but would allow the defendant a chance to explain the circumstances surrounding the PFA matter.
180. See infra text accompanying notes 212–15.
181. See Carlacci, 798 A.2d at 191–92 (Newman, J., dissenting).
182. See id. (“I do not believe that it serves the interests of the citizens of the
Commonwealth to eliminate the exercise of judicial discretion from the expungement process. Therefore, I believe that the balancing test set forth in [Wexler]
should apply in the instant matter.”).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 3–6.
186. See Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1981).
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Because the parties can enter into the consent order on the day
of the final PFA hearing,187 granting the defendant a Wexler hearing in this limited circumstance would allow the defendant to explain to the hearing court why expungement of the record may be
appropriate. Instead of placing the burden on the Commonwealth
to argue for the retention of the records, as in the case of a Wexler
hearing for a criminal expungement matter,188 the defendant could
bear the burden of showing with specificity why the court should
not retain the records. The hearing judge would then decide
whether expungement is proper based on the testimony of the
defendant.
Even though this Wexler hearing scenario could potentially result in a favorable outcome for both parties because the court
would authorize a protection order for the plaintiff without requiring the plaintiff to endure a hearing and give the defendant the opportunity to explain his or her side for the first time, the court
system may be opposed to this solution for fear that it would drain
already limited judicial resources.189
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Carlacci held
that the use of the Wexler balancing test was unnecessary when
PFA proceedings do not progress past the temporary order stage,
the court did not address the merits of granting a Wexler hearing to
the defendant in the case of a final order by consent.190 If the
Carlacci court had granted the defendant a Wexler hearing, the
strength of the plaintiff’s case would have been weighed against the
defendant’s interest in preventing potential harm as a result of the
creation of a PFA record.191
During settlement negotiations of a PFA order by consent, a
plaintiff could ask the court to grant the defendant a Wexler hearing
in exchange for a more favorable consent order, such as an extended length of time192 for the protection order.193 However, the
187. See PA. R. PHILA. CO. FAMILY DIV. 1901.11(d) (“The signed consent
agreement may be submitted to the Court at the hearing.”).
188. Id. at 882 (“The assertion of a general policy opposing expungement in
all cases is not persuasive.” (citing Commonwealth v. Welford, 420 A.2d 1344, 1345
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1980))).
189. See Commonwealth v. Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214, 1220 n.5 (2007).
190. See Carlacci, 798 A.2d at 191.
191. Wexler, 431 A.2d at 879.
192. The maximum length of time for a protection order is three years. 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6108(d) (2017).
193. § 6108(a)(10) (“The court may grant any protection order or approve
any consent agreement to bring about a cessation of abuse of the plaintiff or minor
children. The order or agreement may include granting any other appropriate relief sought by the plaintiff.”).
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Pennsylvania Superior Court in Charnik declined to hold that the
defendant was constitutionally entitled to a Wexler hearing.194
Moreover, the court would likely not be persuaded by a plaintiff’s
request for the court to grant the defendant a Wexler hearing because the Charnik court viewed the granting of protection for the
defendant beyond procedural due process rights with great skepticism.195 Especially considering the scarcity of judicial resources,196
a PFA hearing court would likely be unwilling to allow a PFA plaintiff to use the promise of a Wexler hearing as a settlement negotiation tool.
2.

Reschedule the Final Hearing to Create a Cooling-Off Period

To both avoid a final order being entered and provide the
plaintiff with the protection sought, the court could allow either the
plaintiff or the defendant to simply ask for a continuance and
reschedule the final hearing date.197 As part of this agreement, the
plaintiff could also request that if no ICC violations occur prior to
the new hearing date, then the plaintiff would automatically voluntarily withdraw his or her PFA petition.198 A plaintiff may seek to
avoid a final hearing at all costs, even if the facts of his or her case
weigh heavily in favor of a long-term order. A plaintiff may simply
wish to have as little contact with the defendant as possible and,
thus, being required to attend a court proceeding in the presence of
the alleged abuser may be too stress-inducing and psychologically
difficult for the plaintiff to endure.199 A plaintiff may feel strongly
that a protection order is necessary, but could be so fearful of the
defendant that the plaintiff would rather withdraw his or her petition than testify at a hearing.
This continued temporary order strategy may be favorable to a
fearful PFA petitioner because it would artificially extend the PFA
194. See Charnik, 921 A.2d at 1220.
195. Id. (“Because we read our Supreme Court’s decision in Carlacci as expressly limiting the remedy of expungement of PFA records to those cases where
records exist absent the safeguards of due process . . . we decline to extend the
language until the legislature or our Supreme Court directs.”).
196. Id. at 1220 n.5. (“Like the majority in Carlacci, we too question whether
this would prove to be a proper use of limited judicial resources.”).
197. § 6107(b)(2) (mandating that a temporary order “shall remain in effect
until modified or terminated by the court after notice and hearing”).
198. § 6108(a). See also Cipolla v. Cipolla, 398 A.2d 1053, 1054 n.1 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1979) (“The court is empowered to grant broad relief to bring about a
cessation of abuse . . . .”).
199. See Michael Alan Goldberg, Fighting through the Fear: DART Helps Domestic Violence Victims Navigate their way through Legal System, THE REPORTER
(April 27, 2013, 8:24 PM), http://www.thereporteronline.com/article/RO/20130427/
NEWS01/130429536.
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proceedings yet prevent the proceedings from ever reaching the final hearing stage. Under the PFAA, the temporary order obtained
by the plaintiff would remain in effect up until the date of the final
hearing.200 Thus, the plaintiff would be protected by the temporary
order, and the defendant would have a significant interest in complying with the temporary order for the amount of time between
the continuance request and the final hearing date.
Because the PFA proceedings would technically never reach
the final hearing stage, the defendant would have a right to seek
expungement of his or her civil record201 and the plaintiff could receive a more favorable protection order. The only potential downside to this strategy would be that the PFA matter remains on the
court docket until the rescheduled final hearing date and a judge
may protest that allowing too many continuances could interfere
with the scheduling of new matters.
The benefit to the plaintiff, however, would likely outweigh the
burden on the court system because this amount of time may prove
to be an effective “cooling-off” period that gives the defendant an
even greater incentive to comply with the terms of the temporary
order and refrain from abusing the plaintiff further.202 This strategy
does not allow for automatic expungement.203 The defendant
would need to file a motion to petition the court for expungement
of his or her civil record after the “cooling-off” period is over,
which acts as a further procedural safeguard.204
3. Amend the PFAA to Allow Expungement of Consent Orders
Case precedent stemming from the synthesis of the holdings in
Carlacci,205 Charnik,206 and Nelson207 prevents a defendant from
seeking expungement of a final order by consent because the defendant was likely afforded adequate procedural due process. No statutory authority for expungement of any kind exists in the PFAA
200. § 6107(b)(2).
201. Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 798 A.2d 186, 190–91 (Pa. 2002).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 197–98. If no ICC violations occur
during the “cooling-off” period, then the plaintiff would withdraw the PFA petition on the date of the rescheduled final hearing. See supra text accompanying
notes 197–98.
203. PA. R. CIV. P. 790(A)(1) (“[E]xcept as provided in Rule 320 and 35 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 780–119, an individual who satisfies the requirements for expungement may request expungement by filing a petition with the clerk of the courts of
the judicial district in which the charges were disposed.”).
204. Id.
205. Carlacci, 798 A.2d at 190–91.
206. Commonwealth v. Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214, 1221 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
207. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 690 A.2d 728, 731–32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
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and thus the PFAA would have to be amended to include a statutory expungement provision.
This provision could borrow insight from the limited criminal
statutory expungement provisions,208 specifically those provisions
regarding expungement of summary offenses.209 The amendment
to the PFAA could include language that states:
PFA records may be expunged when an individual who is the
subject of a final order by consent with no admission of abuse
petitions the court for the expungement of the PFA record and
has been free of final protection orders and Indirect Criminal
Contempt (ICC) violations for three years following the execution of the final order by consent. Expungement under this paragraph shall be permitted only for a final order by consent with no
admission of abuse.

Statutorily authorized expungement could provide clarity for a
defendant deciding whether to agree to a final order by consent or
participate in a final hearing.210 If a defendant knew exactly what
steps he or she would need to take in order to expunge his or her
civil record, then the parties may be able to reach a settlement
more amicably and efficiently.
Furthermore, the language as set forth above provides the defendant not only the incentive to comply with the terms of the present consent order, but the incentive to avoid conduct that could
lead to the court issuing a new final protection order for three years
after the present consent order expires. Much like expungement of
a continued temporary order, expungement in this statutory scheme
would not occur automatically and would require the defendant to
file a motion for expungement with the proper court.211
The downside to allowing expungement of a final order by consent stems from the scenario of a repeat defendant. The court may
consider past instances of abuse when determining reasonable fear
of imminent bodily harm.212 The court may also consider past protection orders when deciding the merits of a current PFA petition.213 Evidence of past abuse at the center of a final order by
208. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122 (2017).
209. § 9122(b)(3).
210. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6107 (2017).
211. PA. R. CIV. P. 790(A)(1).
212. Miller ex rel. Walker v. Walker, 665 A.2d 1252, 1259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(“Past abusive conduct on the appellant’s part was a crucial inquiry necessary for
entry of a proper order.”).
213. § 6107(a).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\122-3\DIK302.txt

2018]

unknown

PENNSYLVANIA PROTECTION

Seq: 27

FROM

ABUSE ACT

9-JUL-18

14:44

965

consent with no admission of abuse may also be relevant to a
court’s inquiry in subsequent proceedings.214
Therefore, if the court grants expungement of the record of a
consent order and the defendant commits an act of abuse that leads
to the filing of a new PFA petition, the expunged consent agreement would not be available as evidence in the subsequent proceeding. If the same plaintiff is the most recent victim, however, that
plaintiff could simply testify regarding the past instances of abuse
that led to the original consent order.215 Thus, expungement would
have a negative effect only in the limited scenario in which a new
plaintiff files a PFA petition against a defendant with a previously
expunged civil record.
The benefits of amending the PFAA to include a statutory provision allowing for expungement of consent orders in limited circumstances outweigh the detriments because statutory
expungement facilitates amicable settlements, frees up scarce judicial resources,216 and provides a great incentive to the defendant to
comply with the content of the consent order. All three of these
benefits work toward stopping current abuse and preventing future
abuse for a PFA plaintiff and, thus, statutory expungement coincides with the intended purpose of the PFAA.217
IV.

CONCLUSION

PFA record expungement is a significant but frequently disregarded tool for settlement negotiations218 because of the lack of
statutory guidelines contained within the PFAA219 and the absence
of Pennsylvania Supreme Court case precedent related specifically
to orders by consent with no admission of abuse.220 The purpose of
the PFAA is to stop current abuse and prevent future abuse.221
Providing parties to a PFA matter the bargaining chip of expungement as part of settlement negotiations could facilitate an amicable
resolution of the matter.222
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court would likely find that consent orders are not available for expungement based on case prece214.
215.
216.
2007).
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1263 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
Id.
See Commonwealth v. Charnik, 921 A.2d 1214, 1220 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct.
See
See
See
See
See
See

Lawrence v. Bordner, 907 A.2d 1109, 1112 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
Weems, supra note 7, at 4.
supra Part II.A.
supra Part III.B.1.
supra Part II.A.3.
supra Part III.C.3.
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dent and the current wording of the PFAA.223 Due to this expected
outcome, the option for a PFA plaintiff to use expungement as leverage during settlement negotiations is currently unavailable. Although a plaintiff can circumvent this lack of availability by
attempting to use the potential for a Wexler hearing224 or by asking
for a continuance for the temporary order,225 an amendment to the
PFAA to allow for the expungement of consent orders in limited
circumstances226 provides clarity, facilitates amicable settlement,
and best serves the interests of the parties to a PFA matter and the
judicial system.

223.
224.
225.
226.

See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra

Part
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Part
Part
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